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Abstract
Does the “shaming” of human rights violations influence foreign aid delivery decisions across
OECD donor countries? We examine the effect of shaming, defined as targeted negative atten-
tion by human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), on donor decisions
about how to deliver bilateral aid. We argue that INGO shaming of recipient countries leads
donor governments, on average, to “bypass” the recipient government in favor of non-state aid
delivery channels, including international and local NGOs and international organizations (IOs).
However, we expect this relationship to be conditional on a donor country’s position in the inter-
national system. Minor power countries have limited influence in global affairs and are therefore
more able to centrally promote human rights in their foreign policy. Major power countries,
on the other hand, shape world politics and often confront “realpolitik” concerns that may
require government-to-government aid relations in the presence of INGO shaming. We expect
aid officials of minor donor countries to be more likely to condition aid delivery decisions on
human rights shaming than their counterparts of major donor countries. Using compositional
data analysis, we test our argument using originally collected data on human rights shaming
events in a time-series cross-sectional framework from 2004 to 2010. We find support for our hy-
potheses: On average, OECD donor governments increase the proportion of bypass when INGOs
shame the recipient government. When differentiating between donor types we find that this
finding holds for minor but not for major powers. These results add to both our understanding
of the influences of aid allocation decision-making and our understanding of the role of INGOs
on foreign-policy.
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Introduction
Scholarship has long recognized that foreign aid serves as an instrument of state-craft, used to
promote varied donor countries’ foreign policy goals, including for instance, international security,
commerce, international cooperation, and democratic change.1 Among scholars interested in the
nexus between foreign and human rights, however, a long standing debate continues over whether
donor governments use foreign aid to sanction government-led repression in aid-receiving countries
(Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Alesina and Dollar, 1992; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Alesina
and Dollar, 2000; Rioux and Belle, 2005; Neumayer, 2003a,b; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Nielsen,
2013). Some argue that donor governments prioritize geostrategic or economic considerations over
human rights, making it unlikely that aid officials will systematically punish recipient governments
for human rights violations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a,b). Others find that donor
governments sanction human rights violations with reductions in foreign aid, although cuts are
limited to specific aid types and sectors (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Lebovic and Voeten,
2009; Nielsen, 2013).2
This paper strengthens our knowledge on the link between human rights and foreign aid policy
by developing and testing a model of foreign aid delivery that identifies human rights international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as an influential force in foreign aid decision making. IN-
GOs influence aid decision-making through their “shaming and blaming” campaigns. This negative
publicity influences INGO members’ and ordinary citizens’ views about the country. Once citizens
demand sanctions and generate pressure from below, INGOs have created direct incentives for aid
officials to change aid policy. Even if citizens did not pay much attention to the negative publicity,
INGO shaming would nonetheless create direct incentives for policy-makers to act with the public’s
presumed opinion in mind, as long as the probability of information being revealed to the public
1Examples of studies that examine the link between aid and these different foreign policy objectives include
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), Bapat (2011), Vreeland and Dreher (2014), and Dietrich and Wright (2015),
respectively.
2Cingarelli and Pasquarello (1985) show that the U.S. cuts economic but not military aid support to countries with
human rights violations. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that donor governments pressure international organizations
to sanction repressive behavior with cuts in multilateral aid, while bilateral aid flows between donors and the repressive
recipient government remain unchanged. Nielsen (2013) disaggregates bilateral aid into its various sectors, showing
that human rights violations lead donor governments to cut economic aid but not humanitarian aid. The latter two
findings by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and Nielsen (2013) make important contributions to the literature as they
disaggregate aid and are based on a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process. Both works theorize
and test for important heterogeneity within foreign aid.
1
and of the public reacting negatively to it is sufficiently high.
However, not all foreign officials are equally responsive to pressure from public opinion. That
is, the expected value of changing aid delivery in response to INGO shaming is not the same
across all donor governments. The position of the donor government in the international system
conditions the effect of INGO shaming. Minor power donor governments have limited influence
in world politics and are therefore able to centrally promote human rights in their foreign policy.
Major power donor governments, on the other hand, shape global affairs and are more likely to
be more guided by “realpolitik” concerns, which often trump human rights. Our argument is thus
conditional in nature and we expect INGO shaming to have a greater influence on aid policy in
minor but not major power donor countries.
This paper focuses on donor decisions about how to deliver bilateral aid abroad. As INGOs
increase their shaming activities about government repression, officials are more likely to sanction
the recipient government by channelling bilateral aid through non-state actors, including local
and international NGOs, multilateral organizations,3 and private companies. Indeed, the decision
of donors to “bypass” the recipient public sector with foreign aid is significant. In 2007 OECD
governments delegated over 30 percent (approximately US$ 41 billion) of their bilateral aid to
non-state development actors (OECD 2012, Dietrich 2013).4
We test our arguments using a global statistical model of all aid recipients and OECD donor
governments from 2004 to 2010. Consistent with our argument, we find that, on average, INGO
shaming increases the proportion of aid delivered through bypass, controlling for confounding co-
variates. We also find support that the relationship is conditional on donor type, as our results
suggest that INGO shaming increases bypass more among minor than among major donor countries.
We contribute to the foreign aid and human rights literatures in three ways: First, we strengthen
a burgeoning literature that studies the determinants of bilateral aid delivery decisions.5 Second, we
3Multilateral organizations like the UN increasingly rely on bilateral aid as source of financing, which increases
the amount of projects that they implement directly on behalf of donor governments (Bryant, 2015; Eichenauer
and Knack, 2014). Although multilaterals engage with recipient authorities in project implementation they often
impose strict conditions. As Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find, international organizations promote human rights more
forcefully than bilateral donor governments.
4Others bilateral aid tactics include the imposition of conditionality, or the appropriation of aid budgets into aid
sector.
5Examples include Dreher, Moelders and Nunnenkamp (2010), Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Thiel and Thiele (2012),
Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Oehler and Weisser (2012), Dietrich (2013, Forthcoming), Acht, Mahmoud and Thiele (2015).
More recently, scholars have begun to study important variation in foreign aid provided through multilateral organi-
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introduce international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as important champions of human
rights in the foreign aid decision-making process.6 Third, we account for important heterogeneity
among donor governments, and show how the size of the donor country interacts with INGO
shaming in the recipient country in influencing foreign aid decisions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, we develop our
argument and present the hypotheses. Next, we present our research design, followed by our sta-
tistical tests and results. We conclude the paper by addressing how this project informs our larger
theoretical understanding of the role of non-state actors in aid policy.
The Influence of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Aid Delivery Tactics
Human rights advocacy scholarship rests on the idea that it takes advocacy actors to publicize
human rights violations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). International
human rights advocacy INGOs, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, serve as
key conduits of “shaming and blaming” in the international press (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999;
Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005; Franklin, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012). Human rights INGOs
gather information, issue press releases, contact journalists. The information they gather and share
can make it into media abroad. Through this media attention, they start the process through
which other states and intergovernmental organizations begin to pressure a state to improve its
human rights performance from abroad (Brysk, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These shaming
campaigns, along with other INGO resources, are often concentrated in the most difficult cases,
where domestic pressure for human rights may be limited and institutional structures in support
of human rights are not available (Murdie and Urpelainen, 2015; Barry et al., 2015). Additionally,
shaming campaigns are more concentrated in states with more human rights abuses and in states
that are likely to receive more global attention (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005).
One mechanism by which INGO “shaming and blaming” campaigns can induce policy change
is by influencing public opinion on human rights conditions (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz, 2012;
Ausderan, 2014). Recent research has found that shaming reports alone, even without changes
zations. See Eichenauer and Knack (2014) and Bryant (2015) for examplary work.
6This study builds on a burgeoning literature that investigates the extent to which negative statements about
human rights conditions influence government behavior and a country’s foreign policies (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink,
1999; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013; Murdie and Peksen, 2013).
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in actual human rights conditions, is associated with changes in public opinion (Davis, Murdie
and Steinmetz, 2012; Ausderan, 2014). Further, according to recent World Value Survey reports,
ordinary citizens are more confident of NGOs than of their government or the media. This is
particularly true for wealthy OECD countries,7 where citizens delegate the analysis of information
to trusted actors (Downs 1957, 203-34). Such high levels of public confidence in NGOs bodes well
for their influencing of policy through the bottom-up, as the explicit shaming event is likely to have
quite an impact on the public.
Through “shaming and blaming” INGOs seek to change public opinion on human rights con-
ditions. This tactic is almost always associated with a call for action, and targets both the INGO
membership base8 and the general public. INGOs can create pressure on aid officials through the
channel of public opinion in two ways: First, and upon reading and learning about human rights
atrocities committed by far-way repressive governments, concerned citizens may directly reach out
to their member of parliament to request punishment of human rights violations. The parliamen-
tarian, in turn, will relay this request to the respective parliamentary committee, which in turns
makes direct recommendations to aid officials to sanction the repressive government. Second, even
if citizens do not pay much attention to the INGO shaming and blaming, aid officials will be in-
fluenced by INGO shaming as they act with the public’s presumed opinion in mind. INGOs thus
generate incentives for aid officials to change aid policy. The emerging political imperative to act
was illustrated by a Swedish government official during an author interview: “When news about
human rights violations make headlines in our national paper we certainly discuss whether we
should change our interactions with the partner country. When NGOs take additional steps to go
after dictators in our national newspaper we feel direct pressure to act. At this point we consult
with them directly on how to best move forward given conditions in the country.”9 As illustrated
by the interview anecdote, negative publicity in national news, underwritten by NGOs as credible
agents, motivates public opinion. As research by Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) suggests, in-
formation disseminated through news channels on a “per-story” basis is more successful at chaning
public opinion in the short-run than other information spread through other sources. We add that
7Please see Murdie and Peksen (2014, 218) for a discussion of these World Values Survey findings.
8See Murdie and Davis (2012) and Hendrix and Wong (2013) for examples of this mechanism.
9Author Interview with Senior Government Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, June 18, 2013.
4
news-driven calls for action, as in the case of “shaming and blaming” events, creates strong policy
imperatives for immediate action to signal responsiveness.
Though much scholarship has studied aid officials’ decision to reduce overall levels of bilateral
aid, our argument focuses on aid decision-making regarding the delivery of foreign aid. We claim
that the decision to bypass shamed governments, while channeling aid through non-state develop-
ment actors, represents a more targeted sanctioning mechanism that allows resources to continue to
flow into the country to promote other important goals such as development. Since INGO “shaming
and blaming” usually focuses on the abuse of government power, donor sanctions should target the
culprit directly. Mere reductions in overall aid, on the other hand, are likely to negatively affect
the wider population in need of assistance.10
Drawing on findings from several foreign aid opinion polls of different donor countries, we
posit that citizens will interpret donor government’s decision to bypass “shamed” aid-receiving
governments as strong indicator of government responsiveness to changes in their attitudes. As
is the case across many donor countries, ordinary citizens often prefer bypass tactics in foreign
aid. Data from countries as diverse as Canada (CIDA, 2004), France (AFD, 2011), and Sweden
(Bandstein, 2007) indicate that ordinary citizens support aid for development and humanitarian
purposes but they are less supportive of aid that promotes non-developmental goals. Second,
citizens in many countries show greater baseline support for bypass aid than for government-to-
government aid. This suggests that citizens not only understand that aid modalities vary but that
bypass implies a potential tactic to sanction bad government behavior.
These insights combined suggest that INGO “shaming and blaming” motivates changes in pub-
lic opinion that influence how foreign aid is delivered. Once shaming has occurred publics can
directly articulate their preferences for bypass to their government representatives. Even if the
public were unable to lobby systematically, aid officials still have incentives to directly act upon
shaming with the public’s (presumed) opinion and preferences in mind. This logic has the following
10It is important to note that we do not expect that the entire foreign aid budget earmarked for the public sector in
any given year will be shifted towards non-state actors. Many collaborative donor-recipient projects have a multi-year
time frame and are implemented with the involvement of donor agencies. While many of these projects may be more
difficult to reorient in terms of delivery method, more programmatic and budget-oriented funding can more easily be
redirected to alternative delivery agents. However, according to extensive author interviews with more than 70 aid
decision-makers across OECD donor countries, aid officials have the power to freeze or withhold significant funding
even for multi-year projects if deemed necessary, which may be in the face of unexpected anti-democratic behavior
or corruption.
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empirical implication:
Hypothesis 1: INGO “shaming and blaming” tactics that generate negative public-
ity about the aid-receiving government will increase the share of bilateral aid delivered
through non-state development channels.
Which Donors are Influenced by INGO Shaming?
There is a large comparative literature on the differences in the importance of human rights
concerns in the various foreign policies of states (Carleton and Stohl, 1985; Baehr and Castermans-
Holleman, 1994; Brysk, 2009; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Drawing on this literature, we argue
that foreign aid decision-making is shaped, in part, by the position of the state in the international
system. While small or minor power states have limited influence in world politics, major power
states are in dominant positions of influence that shape critical global issues such as trade and
international security, among other important policy areas. While officials of major power states
like the United States rhetorically promote human rights concerns as key foreign policy issues,
scholars have long recognized that statesmen are guided by “realpolitik” concerns. As Morgenthau
claims there may be “other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights
in a particular circumstance” (Morgenthau, 1979, 7).11 It is minor power states like Sweden or
the Netherlands that are cited for making human rights central in their foreign policy (Baehr,
Castermans-Holleman and Gru¨nfeld, 2002; Brysk, 2009).
We argue that aid officials from major power donor countries, compared to their counterparts
in minor power states, are more likely to encounter instances in aid decision-making when the
promotion of human rights may conflict with, or be overshadowed by geostrategic or commerce-
related goals, among others. For example, if a major power donor government seeks to promote
peace and security in a region, and if that peace is more likely to be guaranteed by a repressive
government, then donor officials have incentives to prop up the regime.12 This preference for regime
stability, in turn, may run counter to the goal of promoting human rights, and thus mitigate the
11Other studies that suggest lack of responsiveness among major power states include Carleton and Stohl (1985)
and Perkins and Neumayer (2010).
12Aid to government channels may be seen as a way to prop up a regime that is having to use repression in the
face of increasing domestic opposition (Escriba`-Folch, 2010; Licht, 2010; Ritter, 2014).
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effect that INGO shaming would have on decisions to bypass the repressive regime.
This logic may be applied to U.S. aid policy toward Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, where U.S.
Congressional leaders and government officials have traditionally favored the promotion of leader
stability through continued government-to-government assistance to the president (Berger, 2012).
Although the regime’s violent repression of anti-government protest in 2013 generated substantial
negative publicity in the media and caused a majority of Americans to advocate for sanctions,
the United States did not change their aid policy in a significant way. The U.S. government’s
preference for regime stability triumphed over the promotion of human rights. The same logic
was raised in the context of discussions about Germany’s bilateral development cooperation with
Ethiopia, a recipient government that has increased its repression of citizens and has been the
target of shaming campaigns and human rights reporting.13 In 2012, increasing negative publicity
prompted the deputy chairman of the German parliament’s committee to claim that “if a country’s
human rights record is deteriorating as is the case in Ethiopia, then the German government
needs to assess whether development aid to that country is essential or not. I personally would
only agree to pay out the cash once there has been significant improvement in human rights”
(Schadomsky 2012, 1). Rather than pulling out altogether, however, further requests were made
that “we [Germany, added by authors] can try to open the door to liberalization in the country, and
to promote Ethiopia’s private sector” (Schadomsky 2012, 1) by channeling aid through non-state
actors. Critics, however, were quick to suggest that Ethiopia’s government will “most certainly
receive the money, because of its importance for Germany’s strategic and economic interests on
the horn of Africa” (Schadomsky 2012, 1). So far, contributions have not significantly, though
marginally, shifted from government-to-government support to bypass in 2014 (OECD CRS 2015).
We thus expect that our argument about the influence of INGO shaming on foreign aid delivery
is conditional on the position of donor countries in the international system. Major and minor
power countries differ from each other in their exposure to and influence in world politics. If ex-
posure and influence are high, as is the case for major power countries, donor officials are more
constrained by “realpolitik” concerns and are thus not likely to systematically respond to INGO
shaming campaigns. If we estimated the effect of shaming on a sample of only minor powers, This
13Evidence of this trend documented in country reports by Human Rights Watch
(www.hrw.org/publications/reports) and Amnesty International (https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/ethiopia/).
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logic leads us to the following empirical implications:
Hypothesis 2: Minor power donor countries will systematically respond to shaming
and blaming events with increases in the proportion of bypass aid. Their Major power
counterparts, on the other hand, will not systematically respond with increases in the
proportion of bypass aid.
This hypothesis implies that we would expect shaming to be significanty different from zero
when the analyses are estimated on a sample of minor powers only. The effect of shaming should
be insignificant when we estimate analysis only on a sample of major powers. It may be, too, that
more limited influence in world politics leads minor donors to respond differently to shaming than
major power donors. For instance, the counterveiling forces of “realpolitik” may cause major power
donor governments to respond with less bypass aid than minor donor countries. This suggests what
we would expect the effect of shaming for minor powers to be positive and in its size systematically
different from major powers. This has the following empirical implication.
Hypothesis 3: In response to shaming minor power donor countries will give sig-
nificantly more bypass aid than major powers.
Research Design, Data and Measures
We explain variation in bypass tactics across 23 OECD donor countries to their recipients. The
universe of recipient countries includes ODA eligible countries as defined by the OECD (including
low, lower middle and upper middle income countries). We test our argument at the level of the
donor-recipient dyad-year. Our temporal domain ranges from 2004 to 2010.
The dependent variable: aid delivery through non-state channels
The outcome of interest is donor decisions to deliver bilateral aid through non-state develop-
ment actors. To construct a measure of bypass, we use data drawn from the OECD CRS aid
activity database. Information on the channel of delivery conveys how foreign aid is delivered: it
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records the amount of bilateral aid flows channeled through five channel categories. These include
government-to-government aid as well as aid delivered to non-governmental organizations, interna-
tional organizations (IOs), and other development actors. The OECD began collecting information
on the “channel of delivery” in 2004. Early years exhibit greater portions of data missingness than
later years because the introduction of the new data item required new data collection procedures
from donor governments (Aidinfo 2008, p. 16). In our main analyses we only include dyad-year
observations for which at least 90 percent of the aid flows are accounted for by a channel of delivery
category.14
In our empirical analyses we use a broad bypass measure that distinguishes between government-
to-government aid and aid channeled through non-state development actors. We define government-
to-government aid as any aid activity that involves the recipient government as an implementing
partner. We define as bypass any aid transaction that delegates control over implementation to
non-state actors. The primary bypass channels include NGOs and IOs. We operationalize the
decision to bypass with a continuous measure, capturing the proportion of aid delivered through
non-state development actors. Figure 1 shows the distribution of bypass in 2009 across OECD
donor countries.
[insert Figure 1 here]
The explanatory variable: human rights INGO shaming
To capture human rights INGO shaming activities towards countries, INGO Shaming, we utilize
an updated version of the human rights international NGO shaming data developed by Murdie and
Davis (2012). We use the version of the dataset first published in Murdie and Peksen (2013). The
entire dataset, ranging from 1990 to 2009 captures the shaming events of over 1,100 human rights-
specific INGOs directed at a recipient country’s government in Reuters Global News Service. These
14As donor governments have increased their capacity for reporting over time, the coverage of the delivery channel
data has steadily increased. In 2004 and 2005 Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States reported data on
this dimension. In 2006, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal joined the group of reporting OECD donors.
By 2007 all OECD provided data on delivery channels with the exception of Luxembourg and Spain. Across all
these countries data coverage is steadily increasing across recipient countries, without any evidence of systematic
underreporting on particular recipient countries.
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events are collapsed to the recipient country-year. The data are based on the framework of the
Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) project and provided by Virtual Research Associates,
Inc (Bond et al., 2003).
For our key indicator of shaming, we use a lagged count of the total number of human rights
INGO reports directed at a recipient government in a given year. We lag this indicator one year
to help account for the idea that shaming would influence donor-decision making in the next aid
year. This indicator varies from 0 to 3 in our sample of recipient countries during our time period;
and between 2003 and 2009 the annual mean number of countries that were shamed at least once
by human rights INGOs was 14. Among aid-recipients, Myanmar is the most frequent target of
INGO shaming in our sample. In 2007, for example, our data record 20 governments that were at
least once shamed by human rights INGOs. Of these 20 countries about half were shamed once.
Human rights INGOs targeted Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Swaziland with two events in the same
year, and Myanmar emerges as most frequent target with 3 shaming events. Figure 2 outlines the
yearly mean of this variable for our sample of recipient countries. When using this indicator, we
include a control variable to capture any media bias in Reuter’s reports, Reuters News Coverage;
this indicator is the natural log of the total number of Reuters Global News Service events in the
updated IDEA dataset. Like our shaming indicator, it is lagged one year in all models.
[insert Figure 2 here]
Controls
As the previous literature on aid policy maintains, other factors shape donor decision-making,
including other human-rights related recipient characteristics and non-developmental donor goals.
We include them as controls to provide a fully specified model. All time-varying right-hand side
variables are lagged one year. We begin with the confounding effects of observable human rights
violations. We use an ordinal scale of physical integrity rights performance from the Cingranelli
and Richards (2010) Human Rights Dataset to construct Physical Integrity Rights. This measure,
which ranges from 0, indicating no respect for physical integrity rights, to 8, indicating full respect
for physical integrity rights, captures governmental performance on four key physical integrity
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rights: freedom from torture, extra-judicial or political killings, political imprisonment, and disap-
pearances. The measure is based on state-level U.S. State Department and Amnesty International
annual reports of governmental human rights practices towards citizens of that state. Kiribati, for
example, has the index’s highest value for government respect of physical integrity rights for the
entire temporal range of our sample while North Korea, for example, takes the lowest value of gov-
ernment respect for physical integrity rights for the entire time period. We include this indicator,
lagged one year, for the recipient countries in the dyad in all statistical models.
We also control for the confounding effects of governance quality in the recipient country. As
research by Dietrich (2013) finds, donor governments pay attention to risk of aid capture in aid-
receiving countries. Weak state institutions and high levels of corruption increase the risk associated
with the delivery of aid to beneficiaries abroad. In response to low governance quality, donor officials
increase the proportion of aid that bypasses the recipient government to avoid aid capture. To
capture the quality of governance we draw on data from the Governance Matters project (Kaufman,
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2012). Our governance measure, Quality of Governance captures a state’s
economic institutions by including corruption control, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
and rule of law as indicators. The values of the measure range between 0 to 5, with higher values
representing a higher quality of governance.
We also include Democracy. Donors may conceive of democratic institutions as political con-
straints that exercise constraints on the ability of the public sector in recipient countries to capture
aid flows. Democracy is measured using the combined score of the Freedom House (2012) civil
liberty and political rights indicators. To make the scale of the measure more intuitive we invert
Democracy so that “1” represents the lowest level of democracy, while “7” stands for the highest
level of democracy. The Freedom House data are widely used among donor governments in their
assessments of democracy. During interviews with donor officials across OECD donor countries
this measure was most often mentioned as informing assessments of political regimes.
We control for the natural log of Disaster Deaths. A greater number of natural disaster related
deaths in the aid recipient, as recorded by the EM-DAT database, may encourage donors to provide
a larger share of the foreign aid pie to NGOs actors that are specialized in disaster efforts. We
further control for low-scale Civil Conflict, as recorded by the PRIO database (Gleditsch and
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Strand, 2002). Domestic conflict may create grievances that provide incentives for donors to favor
more outcome-orientated aid delivery through NGOs to ensure that aid reaches the affected, thus
increasing donor propensity to bypass through NGOs.
We further include Distance to account for the geographical proximity between donor and the
aid-receiving countries. We expect that, as distance between donors and aid-receiving countries
grows, government-to-government relations between donor and recipient governments are expected
to weaken, thus increasing donor propensity to channel aid through non-state development actors.
The distance data come from the Eugene software. The data measure distance between capitals in
miles. The measures are logged (Bennett and Stam, 2000). We further control for Former Colony
status, as recorded by the CIA World Factbook. The data capture whether the recipient country
was a former colony of the donor country in the dyad pair. This allows us to account for long-lasting
diplomatic ties between the donor and the aid receiving governments that may bias aid delivery in
favor of government-to-government aid.
To control for existing economic ties between donor and recipient country, we include Trade
Intensity, measured as the logged sum of imports and exports between the recipient and the OECD
countries by the IMF-DOT database. We also control for security related donor goals by including
Security Council, which is a binary variable indicating whether the aid recipient is a temporary
member on the UN Security Council. As studies by Kuziemko and Werker (2009) and Vreeland
and Dreher (2014) find, donor governments may employ aid to buy votes from rotating members
of the UN Security Council. We also include a logged measure for population size, Population in
the aid-receiving country, since our dependent variable is a count. We expect recipients with larger
populations to be more likely to be shamed by INGOs. Finally, we add a control for the natural
log of the total amount of aid delivered per capita from one donor to its recipient in any given
year, Total per Capita Aid Flows, which comes for the OECD CRS database. We control for this
variable because we expect that, as the volume of aid increases donors are more likely to pursue
strategic goals with the aid as well, which would require government-to-government collaboration,
which in turn would decrease the proportion of bypass.
Analysis and Results
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We now estimate two models that analyze the effect of human rights INGO shaming on foreign
aid delivery. One estimates the average effect of INGO shaming across all donors. The other model
estimates the effect conditional on a donor country’s position in the international system. For
both models we fit a linear OLS model with a log-transformed dependent variable to account for
the proportional nature of our bypass variable. Before specifying the estimating equations we first
provide a brief discussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional outcome measure,
which requires compositional data analysis.
Compositional data analysis15
For any donor-recipient dyad the aid channel share is positive and the sum of the aid channels
shares must be one hundred percent. Consider the aid share A, in donor-recipient dyad i for channel
j. The compositional nature of the variable is expressed by the constraints that the fraction of the
aid share that government-to-government or bypass channels might receive is doubly bounded,
falling between 0 and 1,
Ai,j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j, (1)
with Ai,j denoting the fraction of the aid in donor-recipient dyad i (i=1, ..., N) for delivery
channel j (j=1, J). Government-to-government aid and bypass aid in a given donor-recipient dyad
sums to unity,
J∑
j=1
Aij = 1 ∀ i, j, (2)
where J is the total number of delivery channels, which equal two (government-to-government
and non-state aid) in our case.
Following Aitchison (1986), we create a (J − 1) log aid ratio, which compares the bypass aid to
government-to-government aid:
Yi1 = ln(Ai1/Ai2) = ln(Ai1/(1−Ai1) (3)
15We draw on Dietrich (2013) for notation.
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The advantage of log transforming proportional outcomes is that the outcome is unconstrained,
allowing for a straightforward estimation through OLS. The coefficient of the log-transformed
bypass share variable then describes how the log ratio of bypass aid changes with respect to
government-to-government aid. After modeling, the estimates are transformed back into their
original scale of interest:
Ai1 = (1 + e
−Yi1)−1. (4)
and Y is log-transformed following the steps (1) through (4) above.
Estimating equation
Our first model analyzes the average effects of INGO shaming across all donors. Robust standard
errors are clustered on the dyad.16 Across the analyses we include year, donor, and recipient country
fixed effects. The subsequent equation describes the specified statistical model:
Bypassit = β0 + β1INGOShamingrt + β2Zrt + β3Vit + Yd +Xr +Wt + it,
where i = dyad-varying, r = recipient-varying, and t = time-varying. V= variables that vary at
the dyadic level over time and Z = variables that vary at the recipient level over time. Y = donor
fixed effects, X = recipient fixed effects, and W = time fixed effects.
Second, we re-estimate the model on two separate samples to account for heterogeneity among
donor countries. As hypothesized above, we expect that minor power donor governments are more
likely than their major power counterparts to respond to shaming. To test this specific hypothesis
we first separate donors into major or minor donor types through a dichotomous variable, Minor
Donor, that is coded “1” for minor power status, and “0” for major power status. We code the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, as major and the remaining OECD
donor governments as minor powers.
When comparing the coefficients of our subsample analyses based on tests using a seemingly-
unrelated regression framework, resulting chow test statistics indicate that, in the aggregate, the
coefficients from minor and major power donor samples are statistically different from one another.
16The results are robust to alternative cluster specifications on the recipient country and the donor country.
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This finding suggests that the variables in our model have different effects in the subsamples. It
also suggests that different factors motivate the foreign aid delivery decisions from minor and major
power donors. We further explored differences between donor types and found that major donor
governments, on average, provide bilateral aid for more than 113 recipient countries in our sample,
while minor power countries send assistance to 92 on average.
Nonetheless, in a third step, we interact the Minor Donor indicator with our INGO shaming
variable in a full donor sample to assess if minor and major powers respond differently to shaming;
i.e., whether minor powers respond more to shaming than major powers. In doing so we claim that
our major versus minor power distinction is a difference in donor type that should not only matter
for uncovering conditional effects of INGO shaming. Rather, we expect that several of the right-
hand-side variables should have differential effects on minor and major powers.17 The presence of
multiple differential effects based on donor type has direct implications for our modeling strategy.
Since an OLS model that only includes a Minor Donor*INGO Shaming interaction, alongside
the respective constituent terms, assumes that the (uninteracted) control variables have the same
effect on the outcome in minor and major power donor countries, it is not feasible. Instead our
model specification features the Minor Donor*INGO Shaming interaction, alongside the constituent
terms and the controls interacted with Minor Donor. Again, we fit a linear OLS model with a log-
transformed dependent variable, with robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.18 Across the
analyses we include year and recipient country fixed effects. The following equation describes the
specified statistical model:
Bypassit = β0 + β1INGOShamingrt + β2DonorMinor,d + β3DonorMinor,d ∗ INGOShamingrt +
β4Zrt ∗DonorMinor,d + β5Vi,t ∗DonorMinor,d + Yd +Xr +Wt + it,
where i = dyad-varying, r = recipient-varying, and t = time-varying. V= variables that vary at
the dyadic level over time and Z = variables that vary at the recipient level over time. Y = donor
fixed effects, X = recipient fixed effects, and W = time fixed effects.
17For example, we should expect differential effects for distance. Minor power donor governments have less reach
and less capacity to implement their own projects. As distance increases we should expect minor powers to decrease
bypass and channel more aid through the government-to-government channel. For major powers we might not expect
there to be as strong as an effect, perhaps we even expect the opposite outcome.
18Again, the results are robust to alternative cluster specifications.
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Across our specifications we identified autocorrelation when using the Wooldridge test for panel
data (Wooldridge 2002, 282-283). To address autocorrelation researchers typically include a lagged
dependent variable. However, in light of the limited temporal domain of a our data and the inclu-
sion of three-way fixed effects we acknowledge statistical concerns related to Nickell bias (Nickell,
1981). We opt to estimate models without lagged dependent variables in the main manuscript.
For robustness we estimate a series of models that include the lagged dependent variable in the
appendix.19 The results are robust to including a lagged dependent variable.
Results
In Tables 1 through 4 we present our main findings. Our argument suggests that, on average,
donor governments are responsive to INGO shaming reports insofar as an increase in shaming will
increase the proportion of bypass aid abroad. However, we expect this relationship to be conditional
on donor type: we expect our shaming variable to have a stronger positive effect on bypass for minor
power donor countries. We find statistical support for these hypotheses.
We begin by discussing the average effects of INGO shaming across all donors. The first column
of Table 1, Model 1, presents the results of a stripped down model that only include essential
confounders, alongside the three-way fixed effect specifications, as indicated at the bottom of the
table.20 The model includes our human rights INGO shaming variable alongside the logged Reuters
news count, which we include to account for any media bias towards the recipient country. We
also add a logged variable that captures total aid per capita flows within a donor-recipient pair
in a given year. The coefficient of INGO Shaming is positive and highly significant. In Table
1, Model 2 we show the results of more fully specified models which include the entire set of
control variables discussed earlier. Again, the human rights INGO shaming variable is positively
and statistically significantly associated with bypass. This provides evidence that, on average,
“shaming and blaming” through human rights INGOs directly affects donor governments’ decision
19The Appendix is available on the Review of International Organization’s webpage.
20Given our short time span and small within-unit sample sizes we opt for the inclusion of donor and recipient fixed
effects instead of dyad fixed effects. If the within unit sample size is small, the unit effects alone may account for most
of the variation in our bypass variable. What is more there are time-invariant dyadic variables in the specification
that are very important to include in the model, including distance. If we included dyadic fixed effects this control
would drop out as it is perfectly collinear with the set of unit dummy variables. This makes it impossible to estimate
the unique effects of that variable. We nonetheless estimated the model using dyad fixed effects and the shaming
coefficient (with a p-value of 0.108) just misses conventional levels of statistical significance.
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to bypass across the entire sample of OECD donor countries.
[insert Table 1 here]
To ensure the robustness of this finding, we conduct additional estimations on alternative depen-
dent variables. First, we address the concern that human rights shaming might influence different
aid sectors differentially. For instance, human rights shaming might influence economic aid but not
social aid, as we learn from Nielsen (2013). We therefore tested our theory at a more disaggregated
level. We created two bypass variables, one for economic aid and another one for social sector
aid. We regressed each independently on our set of right hand side covariates. In Table 1, Model
3 we show the results of social aid bypass and Model 4 presents the results for economic aid. In
both cases, the INGO shaming variable is statistically significant at conventional levels. The INGO
coefficients are similar in size, with a slightly bigger INGO shaming coefficient for the economic aid
bypass model. This suggests that INGO shaming has similar effects on aid delivery decisions for
different types of aid. For robustness, we re-estimate all models of Table 1 with specifications that
include a lagged dependent variable. The results remain robust.21
Second, we address the potential concern that human rights INGO shaming may more quickly
induce changes in absolute levels of government-to-government aid, such as, for instance, budget
support, but not in levels of aid to non-state actors which may take more time to limit due to multi-
year roll-out contracts. This would suggest that changes in the proportion of aid may be merely a
function of changes in government-to-government but not bypass aid.22 We estimated a model with
levels of government-to-government aid as the dependent variable.23 The model includes the same
battery of control variables. It also includes the three-way fixed effects specifications. In Table
1 Model 5 we present the results. We find that human rights INGO shaming has no systematic
influence on levels of government-to-government aid. In further tests we show that shaming is
not associated with overall levels of aid, which suggests that donor governments do not change
21We present the results in the appendix Table 1, Models 1 through 4.
22We thank the editor and one anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
23The sample is slightly bigger as it excludes the Total Aid Per Capita measure. This measure captures per capita
levels of foreign aid that flow between donor and recipient pair given that at least 90 percent of the channel of delivery
data was reported to the OECD CRS.
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overall levels of foreign aid in response to shaming events. We do find, however, that shaming is
associated with increased levels of bypass aid. This additional evidence suggests that aid officials
thinks systematically about foreign aid delivery and use bypass delivery channels selectively.24
In light of these statistical findings, we proceed to explore the substantive effects of human
rights INGO shaming on aid delivery. How large is the aggregate donor response to human rights
INGO shaming activities? We compute predictive margins of donor responses, varying the count
of human rights INGO shaming activities on the basis of estimations conducted for the results in
Table 1 Model 3. The average bypass share of 56 percent increases to 60 percent if the country gets
shamed once by a human rights INGO in any given year. The average bypass share increases to
60 percent if the country gets shamed two times in any given year. It increases to 63 percent if the
aid-receiving country is shamed three times by an INGO. We consider these effects quite sizeable
given that we are assessing the influence of INGOs on a government’s decision-making process.
Importantly, our argument presumes that donors always have a choice between two viable
channel options, the government-to-government and bypass channels. However, in some countries
recipient governments often lack functional competence or may not even formally exist. In such
environments bypass may be the only option for donors. To account for this possibility, we re-
estimate Table 1, Model 2 three times, each time excluding a larger set of “fragile” states on the
full sample of donors. We follow the Failed States Index for a definition of fragile state (Failed
States Index 2013). The results are robust to excluding functionally incompetent governments
from the model.25
We present further evidence for the robustness of our findings in Table 2. Recent work by
Felbermayr and Groeschl (2014) shows that the EM-DAT natural disaster data are correlated with
a country’s GDP. In Model 1, we therefore use levels of humanitarian aid as a proxy for natural
disaster related damages to a country.26 We re-estimate our fully specified model but replace
our control for logged natural disaster deaths with the logged amout of humanitarian aid that is
24Table 2 in the appendix presents further tests that explore the effects of INGO Shaming on levels of social and
economic sector aid. Again, INGO Shaming is not systematically associated with levels of aid.
25Table 3 in the appendix presents the results for the INGO coefficients from three different samples that exclude the
top 10, top 15, and top 20 most fragile states in the international system. The model specifications include ones with
and ones without the lagged dependent variable. The size of the coefficients are increasing in size as the estimation
sample becomes more limited to include only aid-receiving countries with functionally competent governments.
26We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this issue and suggesting the alternative proxy.
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delivered to a recipient by a given donor in a year. The results remain robust to the inclusion of
humanitarian aid in lieu of EM-DAT-based disaster deaths.
[insert Table 2 here]
We also present results that rule out two potential alternative explanations. The first potential
alternative explanation might be that the relationship between human rights INGO shaming and
bypass might be driven by the larger phenomenon of globalization. Globalization contributes to
the spread of human rights ideas and values. In a globalized state, an increasing number of human
rights NGOs or INGOs establish relationships with each other, develop cross-border networks and
communication that increases pressure on parliamentarians and aid officials in donor countries to
take their human rights concerns seriously. To rule out that human rights INGO shaming is a
proxy for globalization, we include a measure of the recipient country’s globalization in our models.
Specifically, we use the aggregate globalization measure by Dreher (2006) that subsumes three
sub-measures for economic, social, and political globalization. Our results remain robust to the
inclusion of the globalization variable, as shown in Table 2, Model 2.
The second potential alternative explanation for the systematic relationship between human
rights INGO shaming and bypass may operate through the mechanism of direct civil society pressure
on foreign aid officials in donor headquarters and/or field offices. In response to shaming, INGOs in
donor or aid-receiving countries may become more vocal in requesting that repressive governments
be punished. If this were true we would expect a positive correlation between the number of INGOs
in donor and/or aid-receiving countries and government officials decision to bypass. We therefore
collected data from Yearbook of International Organizations to create two measures: the number
of INGOs in donor and aid-receiving countries in any given year. We log and lag these variables
in our estimations. Table 2 Model 3 includes the count of INGOs in recipient countries. Table 2
Model 4 includes the count of INGOs in donor countries. The main results are robust to including
these two variables.
In a next step, we present findings from the second set of estimations, which tests our hypotheses
about heterogeneity across donors and its effect on foreign aid delivery. Our first hypothesis states
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that officials of minor power donor countries are more responsive to INGO shaming than major
power countries. As indicated above, we are testing this hypothesis in a split sample framework.
We choose to do so because statistical tests that compare the coefficients of the minor and major
donor samples suggest that they are statistically different from one another. We conclude that
variables in our model have different effects in the subsamples and that aid officials from minor and
major power donors respond to different factors. Further tests for differences in factors that drive
foreign aid delivery decision-making between donor types we find that major donors give aid to 113
recipient countries, on average, while minor power countries send assistance to 92 on average.
Table 3 Models 1 through 4 show findings from a split sample model. While Models 1 and 3
include basic specifications on the basis of minor and major donor country samples, Models 2 and
4 present findings from the more fully specified models, which account for the potential alternative
explanations of globalization and direct civil society pressure. Across all models we include a
three-way fixed effects specification and cluster our standard errors on the donor-recipient pair.
According to our argument we expect to see a positive and statistically significant coefficient in
Models 1 and 2, where we focus on minor donors. We find support in both models. The “INGO
Shaming” coefficient remains statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 4, which are estimated on
a sample of major powers. We interpret these results as evidence that donors vary in the extent
to which they respond to INGO shaming: while minor power governments systematically re-orient
aid delivery towards non-state actors, major power donor governments do not exhibit systematic
patterns of this behavior.27
[insert Table 3 here]
Our findings hold across a variety of additional robustness tests. For instance, we re-estimate our
models controlling for UNGA Voting Similarity between any of our dyads. The results are robust
to the inclusion of the affinity measure.28 Also we re-estimate our main models using related,
though conceptually distinct measures from INGO shaming. For instance, our results continue
27We re-estimate the model using a seemingly-unrelated regression framework. The results are very similar to the
independent subsample analysis and are presented in Table 9 of the appendix.
28We thank one anonymous reviewer suggestion and present the findings in Table 8 in the appendix.
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to hold when controlling for the overall logged number of background reports and press releases
from Amnesty International, as employed by Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005). We also re-estimate
our model using Nielsen’s (2013) logged general measure of human rights attention, the log of total
number of human rights stories about a country in the New York Times. Again, our INGO shaming
variable remains positive and statistically significant. This finding provides further support of our
argument suggesting not only that INGOs are a trusted source of information among the public
and that mere human rights stories are not equivalent to the role of human rights INGO shaming.
29 Finally, we also conduct additional robustness tests using GLM as an alternative estimator. The
results remain robust.30
Subsequently, we test our third hypothesis about the differential effects of human rights INGO
shaming on aid delivery for minor and major power donor governments using an interaction model
that pools both donor types. We expect officials of minor power donor countries to bypass more
than officials from major power donors in response to shaming. For this to be true we would expect
to find a significant Minor Donor*INGO Shaming interaction term. Table 3 presents the findings.31
Model 1 offers results from a basic specification, while Model 2 offers findings from a more fully
specified model that present the main interaction term alongside the full set of control variables
interacted with Minor Donor. Both models also include year and recipient country fixed effects,
with standard errors clustered on the donor-recipient pair.
As the findings of Table 4 indicate the interaction term is insignificant in both models. This
suggests that we do not find evidence for our third hypothesis which tests the expectation that minor
power donor governments respond more to shaming than major power governments. Although
results from earlier subsample analyses show that minor donors are more likely to respond to
shaming than major power donors, we do not find that shaming leads to higher proportions in
bypass among minor than major power donors. We posit that this lack of evidence likely results
from large variance of the effect of shaming in major power donors, as indicated in the large standard
errors of shaming in the major power donor sample.
29We present the results of these estimations on a full sample as well as the minor and major power samples
separately in Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix.
30Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix show the results.
31Since we should expect major and minor powers to respond differently to at least some confounders we include
the controls in interaction with Minor Donor.
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[insert Table 4 here]
To further probe into the lack of statistical significance of the interaction term we conducted
further tests in our subsamples. That is, we re-estimated our subsample models presented Table 3
and included donor-year fixed effects. It could be that the impact of various foreign policy concerns
(other than human rights) may vary year to year. It may be for instance, that, in one year, domestic
unrest in one country that has spill-over potential into national security may focus major govern-
ment’s attention on global security, which might bias aid delivery in favor of more government to
government assistance to strengthen a state’s military capacity. Alternatively, international eco-
nomic shocks in other years may require major countries to shift their priorities to helping with
global economic recovery. Therefore, unless we can include every facet of these year-to-year factors,
the major power shaming coefficient will pick up some of that variation, which may explain its
sizeable standard error and the insignificant coefficient. Although the inclusion of donor year fixed
effects reduces some of the uncertainty around our shaming coefficient estimates in the major power
sample, the coefficient remains statistically significant at conventional levels. In the minor power
sample, however, we find that the shaming coefficient remains statistically significant controlling
for donor-year fixed effects. Once again, this suggests that minor power donor governments are less
motivated by global strategy and can focus more on the promotion of human rights policy.
Implications and Conclusion
This study developed and tested a model that links INGO human rights shaming tactics to
foreign aid delivery decisions, while accounting for heterogeneity among donor countries. We argue
that human rights INGOs create pressure on foreign aid officials via the channel of public opinion.
Through targeted “shaming and blaming” campaigns INGOs mobilize their own membership base
as well as the larger public in donor countries to demand from their parliamentary representatives
that repressive government be sanctioned. Once lobbied by their constituents, members of parlia-
ment relay their citizens’ concerns to aid officials, which creates pressure to act. In response, aid
officials will sanction repressive governments by increasing the proportion of bilateral aid that is
channeled through non-state development actors abroad. At the same time, we argue that not all
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donor governments are equally responsive to direct pressure through INGO shaming. Relative to
minor power donors, major power donors are heavily involved in shaping global affairs and are thus
more likely to face countervailing security or commercial pressures that demand a continuation of
government-to-government aid relations in the face of INGO shaming. We find statistical support
for our predictions.
Our findings convey that human rights INGOs, through targeted “shaming and blaming” cam-
paigns can shape foreign aid delivery. Through “shaming and blaming” INGOs influence public
opinion and, through the bottom up, create direct incentives for aid officials to change the mecha-
nism of aid delivery in ways that sanctions the repressive government yet still provides aid in ways
that can promote development through alternative, non-state development actors. This finding
dovetails with emerging research on the influence of INGOs on foreign policy decision-making more
broadly (Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013; Murdie and Peksen, 2013, 2014).
We also find that INGO influence varies by the donor country’s position in the international
system. INGO shaming is more likely to systematically influence aid officials from minor power
donor countries than major power ones, whose countries have more limited influence in world politics
and where INGO-generated pressure from below is sidelined through “realpolitik” concerns. not
who can thus make human rights a central tenet in their foreign policy. This finding is consistent
with extant research finding that acknowledge difficulties associated with enforcing human rights
abroad as donor governments reward recipients for economic, historical, political, and/or military
relevance; and that show that influential countries like the United States, despite rhetoric to the
contrary, has not used foreign aid systematically to sanction repression abroad (Carleton and Stohl,
1985; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010).
This study lays the groundwork for an extension that accounts for heterogeneity in bypass
tactics. Our work introduces an argument that associates INGO shaming with general bypass
tactics, conditional on minor power donor status. In our definition of bypass we include national or
international NGO channels as well as multilateral organizations, public private partnerships and
private sector channels. Future work could explore potential differential effects of INGO shaming
on the variety bypass tactics. Initial tests show that donor governments, on average, use both
NGOs and multilaterals as bypass channels in response to shaming but rely less on other non-state
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actors. Such work would open up the black box of bypass and contribute to an ever more nuanced
understanding of foreign aid policy.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Aid Channeled through Bypass Across Donor Countries
in 2009. The red-line represents the mean bypass share across all OECD governments in
2009. Source: OECD CRS Database (2013)
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Figure 2: INGO Shaming of Human Rights Violations, 2004-2010. Mean count
of NGO shaming activities recorded in Reuters Global News Service. Source: Murdie and
Davis (2012b), updated
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
All Aid All Aid Economic Aid Social Aid All Aid All Aid All Aid
Bypass Bypass Bypass Bypass Govt-to-Govt Bypass Total
Share Share Share Share Levels Levels Levels
INGO Shaming 0.477** 0.446** 0.445** 0.477** -0.205 0.184* -0.006
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.14) (0.10) (0.04)
Reuters News Count 0.124 0.055 -0.174 0.119 -0.006 -0.027 0.008
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
Human Rights 0.012 0.073 0.069 -0.033 -0.037 -0.034
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
Quality of Governance -0.457 -0.550 -1.192 0.644 0.601 0.659**
(0.82) (0.82) (0.88) (0.56) (0.54) (0.20)
Democracy -0.430* -0.033 0.017 0.389** -0.092 0.041
(0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.14) (0.05)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.010 -0.046 -0.039 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Civil Conflict 0.112 0.438 -0.077 0.066 0.158 0.086
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.26) (0.19) (0.08)
Distance 0.060 0.032 0.390 -2.250** -2.003** -1.367**
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.20) (0.20) (0.11)
Former Colony 0.005 -0.361 6.000 -0.454 -0.746 -1.034
(3.75) (3.01) (3.97) (2.45) (2.67) (1.15)
Trade Intensity -0.045 -0.072 0.039 0.185** 0.120** 0.086**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Security Council 0.263 0.167 0.264 0.103 0.285 0.064
(0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.21) (0.19) (0.07)
Population 4.578 3.010 -6.707 -2.222 4.168 1.783*
(4.57) (4.56) (4.53) (3.21) (2.57) (1.03)
Total Aid per capita -0.043** -0.037* -0.059** -0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 9631 9446 9446 9446 10130 10130 10130
Table 1: Explaining share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010.
+p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year
fixed effects) included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INGO Shaming 0.408** 0.458*** 0.483*** 0.446**
(0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Humanitarian Aid 0.054***
(0.01)
Globalization Index 0.049
(0.05)
Number of NGOs in Recipient 0.001
(0.01)
Number of NGOs in Donor 0.005**
(0.00)
Reuters News Count 0.080 0.049 0.050 0.054
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Human Rights 0.048 0.017 0.036 0.017
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Quality of Governance 0.091 -0.589 -0.518 -0.481
(1.08) (0.84) (0.83) (0.81)
Democracy -0.485* -0.426* -0.386* -0.422*
(0.28) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.014 -0.011 -0.009
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Civil Conflict 0.419 0.136 0.153 0.105
(0.44) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Distance -0.226 0.137 0.032 0.075
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Former Colony 4.077 -0.699 0.506 0.085
(4.21) (3.86) (3.78) (3.69)
Trade Intensity -0.018 -0.007 -0.045 -0.043
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Security Council 0.289 0.222 0.258 0.260
(0.37) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Population -1.450 4.111 3.569 4.399
(5.66) (4.56) (4.58) (4.56)
Total Aid per capita -0.280*** -0.036* -0.037* -0.035*
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 7042 9367 9276 9446
Table 2: Robustness analyses: ruling out alternative explanations. Dependent
variable is share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010. +p =
0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year fixed
effects) included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Minor Power Minor Power Major Power Major Power
INGO Shaming 0.461** 0.515** 0.268 0.326
(0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
Reuters News Count 0.040 0.026 0.069 0.108
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Quality of Governance -0.573 -0.906 -0.995 -1.080
(1.02) (1.05) (1.08) (1.15)
Democracy -0.376 -0.324 -0.402 -0.294
(0.27) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)
Human Rights 0.057 0.101 -0.098 -0.142
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
Civil Conflict 0.023 0.110 0.235 0.160
(0.41) (0.41) (0.61) (0.60)
Distance -0.190 -0.161 0.846*** 0.768***
(0.36) (0.36) (0.29) (0.29)
Former Colony -1.673 -2.695 5.518 3.963
(3.56) (3.71) (5.39) (5.75)
Trade Intensity -0.093* -0.055 0.219*** 0.217***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Security Council 0.073 0.001 0.899* 0.897*
(0.37) (0.37) (0.49) (0.47)
Population 8.439 6.759 -6.409 -2.962
(5.61) (5.57) (6.50) (6.75)
Total Aid per capita -0.085*** -0.086*** 0.030 -0.033
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Globalization Index 0.093 -0.020
(0.06) (0.08)
Number of NGOs in Recipient 0.008 -0.011
(0.02) (0.02)
Number of NGOs in Donor -0.005 -0.015***
(0.01) (0.00)
N 7016 6823 2441 2385
Table 3: Subsample analyses: explaining the effects of INGO shaming on share
of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010, for minor and major
power donors separately. +p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects
(donor and recipient country, year fixed effects) included (not reported). Standard errors
clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2
INGO Shaming 0.263 0.123
(0.29) (0.30)
Minor 0.403 6.593
(0.76) (5.09)
Minor*INGO Shaming 0.307 0.432
(0.36) (0.37)
Minor* Reuters News Count 0.010 -0.036
(0.13) (0.14)
Minor* Human Rights -0.001
(0.11)
Minor* Quality of Governance -0.271
(0.88)
Minor* Democracy -0.289
(0.24)
Minor* Natural Disaster Deaths -0.002
(0.04)
Minor* Civil Conflict 0.041
(0.41)
Minor* Distance -0.890**
(0.39)
Minor* Trade Intensity -0.337***
(0.08)
Minor* Security Council 0.084
(0.39)
Minor* Population 5.231
(4.81)
Minor* Total Aid per capita -0.103*** -0.083***
(0.02) (0.03)
N 9631 9446
Table 4: Explaining conditional effects of INGO Shaming on share of bilateral
aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010. +p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Year and
recipient fixed effects included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient
pair.
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APPENDIX
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
All Aid All Aid Social Aid Economic Aid All Aid
Bypass Bypass Bypass Bypass Govt-to-Govt
Share Share Share Share Levels
All Aid Bypass (lag) 0.345** 0.376**
(0.02) (0.02)
Social Aid Bypass (lag) 0.300**
(0.01)
Economic Aid Bypass (lag) 0.281**
(0.01)
Total Gov’t-to-Gov’t Aid Levels (lag) 0.487**
(0.02)
INGO Shaming 0.345+ 0.317+ 0.536** 0.434* -0.061
(0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.26) (0.18)
Reuters News Count 0.092 0.069 -0.171 0.181 -0.000
(0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10)
Human Rights 0.013 0.221* -0.016 -0.062
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
Quality of Governance -1.092** -0.518 -0.148 -0.140
(0.18) (1.06) (1.05) (0.71)
Democracy -0.061 -0.227 0.193 0.389**
(0.06) (0.28) (0.29) (0.18)
Natural Disaster Deaths 0.033 -0.056 -0.033 -0.022
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Civil Conflict 0.587** 0.739 0.078 -0.035
(0.21) (0.50) (0.50) (0.34)
Distance 0.137 -0.138 -0.001 -0.952**
(0.13) (0.23) (0.23) (0.14)
Former Colony 0.387** 0.755 2.736 -1.029
(0.16) (3.66) (4.02) (2.28)
Trade Intensity -0.121** -0.056 0.029 0.116**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Security Council 0.174 0.535 0.342 0.035
(0.27) (0.37) (0.37) (0.22)
Population -0.043 2.951 -4.155 1.086
(0.09) (5.56) (5.48) (3.30)
Total Aid per capita -0.170** -0.083** -0.142** -0.027
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
N 7162 7032 7032 7032 7032
Table 1: Explaining share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010.
+p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year
fixed effects) included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Social Aid Social Aid Economic Aid Economic Aid
Levels Levels Levels Levels
w/o LDV w/ LDV w/o LDV w/ LDV
Social Aid Levels (lag) 0.450**
(0.02)
Economic Aid Levels (lag) 0.435**
(0.01)
INGO Shaming 0.062 0.204 -0.239 -0.317
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.28)
Reuters News Count -0.134 -0.211 -0.104 -0.115
(0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
Human Rights -0.103 -0.071 0.225* 0.245*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Quality of Governancy 0.298 0.394 1.625 -0.102
(1.02) (0.82) (1.13) (0.97)
Democracy 0.212 0.207 0.433 0.092
(0.27) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.093** -0.058 0.014 0.059
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Civil Conflict 0.481 0.345 -0.232 -0.275
(0.45) (0.40) (0.52) (0.50)
Distance -3.406** -1.624** -4.173** -1.788**
(0.38) (0.23) (0.46) (0.27)
Former Colony -5.145 -2.783 -11.506** -5.203
(5.76) (4.18) (4.98) (3.63)
Trade Intensity 0.405** 0.228** 0.276** 0.134**
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Security Council -0.504 -0.780** -0.092 0.131
(0.34) (0.29) (0.38) (0.36)
Population 3.692 3.731 16.890** 9.667**
(5.14) (4.04) (5.58) (4.57)
N 10130 9446 10130 9446
Table 2: Robustness Analyses Using Social and Economic Aid Levels as Depen-
dent Variables, 2004-2010. +p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects
(donor and recipient country, year fixed effects) included (not reported). Standard errors
clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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All Donors INGO Shaming N INGO Shaming N
Table 1, Model 2 Table 1 Appendix, Model 2
without LDV with LDV
w/o “top 10” failed states 0.345* 7822 0.316 6151
(0.20) (0.24)
w/o “top 15” failed states 0.589** 7390 0.599** 5814
(0.24) (0.28)
w/o “top 20” failed states 0.668** 7077 0.596** 5581
(0.24) (0.29)
Table 3: Coefficients and SEs of INGO Shaming Variable, Various Cut-Off
Points for Government Competence. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way (Donor,
recipient, and year) fixed effects included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-
recipient pair.
Figure 1: Marginal effects of minor donor across INGO shaming counts, ac-
counting for alternative explanations (KOF, INGO count in donor and re-
cipient country, interacted with “Minor Power”). Year and recipient fixed effects
included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Donors Minor Power Major Power
INGO Shaming 0.547*** 0.612** 0.294
(0.21) (0.25) (0.28)
Amnesty International Background/Press Releases -0.027* -0.036* -0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Reuters News Count 0.063 -0.010 0.186
(0.21) (0.27) (0.32)
Human Rights -0.096 -0.112 -0.010
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17)
Quality of Governance -0.191 0.289 -1.374
(0.95) (1.23) (1.15)
Democracy -0.370 -0.356 -0.381
(0.24) (0.30) (0.32)
Civil Conflict 0.034 -0.162 0.471
(0.40) (0.47) (0.67)
Distance 0.196 -0.184 1.005***
(0.29) (0.42) (0.32)
Former Colony 52.699* 55.546 43.245
(30.57) (39.24) (39.11)
Trade Intensity 0.033 -0.009 0.212*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
Security Council 0.303 0.208 0.598
(0.33) (0.39) (0.49)
Population -9.014* -9.583 -7.496
(5.39) (6.93) (6.91)
Total Aid per capita -0.045** -0.094*** 0.076**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
N 7276 5459 1817
Table 4: Robustness Analyses OLS: Explaining the effects of INGO sham-
ing on share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010, controlling
for Ron, Ramos, and Rodger’s (2005) logged Amnesty International measure
across three samples (all donors, and minor and major donors separately.
+p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year
fixed effects) included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Donors Minor Power Major Power
INGO Shaming 0.387** 0.411* 0.251
(0.18) (0.22) (0.27)
New York Times -0.055 -0.059 -0.059
(0.13) (0.16) (0.20)
Reuters News Count 0.262 0.248 0.257
(0.21) (0.26) (0.30)
Human Rights 0.019 0.032 0.004
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16)
Quality of Governance -0.476 -0.205 -1.165
(0.90) (1.10) (1.13)
Democracy -0.420* -0.447 -0.379
(0.24) (0.29) (0.31)
Civil Conflict -0.087 -0.266 0.290
(0.37) (0.43) (0.70)
Distance 0.264 -0.003 0.915***
(0.28) (0.41) (0.29)
Former Colony -13.733 -21.243 19.138
(17.81) (22.01) (22.63)
Trade Intensity -0.003 -0.048 0.197*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Security Council 0.245 0.010 1.005**
(0.32) (0.38) (0.51)
Population 3.647 5.930 -5.961
(4.89) (6.03) (6.30)
Total Aid per capita -0.055*** -0.094*** 0.063*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
N 7916 6036 1880
Table 5: Robustness Analyses OLS: Explaining the effects of INGO shaming
on share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010, controlling for
Nielsen’s New York Times’ logged count measure across three samples (all
donors, and minor and major donors separately. +p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year fixed effects) included (not
reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All Donors Minor Power Major Power
INGO Shaming 0.167*** 0.195*** 0.081
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Reuters News Count -0.011 -0.040 0.025
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Human Rights -0.013 -0.009 -0.033
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Quality of Governancy -0.258 -0.165 -0.454
(0.23) (0.28) (0.38)
Democracy -0.164*** -0.154** -0.202*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.009 -0.007 -0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Civil Conflict 0.024 -0.006 0.096
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17)
Distance 0.223*** 0.005 0.547***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
Former Colony 0.744 0.256 2.964**
(0.93) (1.22) (1.44)
Trade Intensity -0.014 -0.026** 0.025
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Security Council 0.066 0.043 0.211
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17)
Population 0.250 1.512 -3.707*
(1.17) (1.44) (1.95)
Total Aid per capita -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.026**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 9446 7011 2435
Table 6: GLM Analyses: Explaining the effects of INGO shaming on share
of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010, across three samples (all
donors, and minor and major donors separately. +p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05. Three-way fixed effects (donor and recipient country, year fixed effects) included (not
reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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Model 1
All Donors
INGO Shaming 0.099
(0.11)
Minor 1.633
(1.13)
Minor* INGO Shaming 0.062
(0.12)
Minor* Reuters News Count -0.039
(0.04)
Minor* Human Rights -0.017
(0.03)
Minor* Quality of Governance -0.110
(0.22)
Minor* Democracy -0.095
(0.06)
Minor* Natural Disaster Deaths -0.008
(0.01)
Minor* Civil Conflict -0.042
(0.11)
Minor* Distance -0.045
(0.06)
Minor* Trade Intensity -0.065***
(0.01)
Minor* Security Council 0.037
(0.10)
Minor* Population -0.244
(1.11)
Minor* Total Aid per capita -0.019***
(0.01)
N 9446
Table 7: GLM Analyses: Explaining the conditional effects of INGO shaming
on share of bilateral aid delivered through bypass, 2004-2010. +p = 0.11, ∗p <
0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Recipient country and year fixed effects included (not reported). Standard
errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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All Donors Minor Donors Major Donors
INGO Shaming 0.448** 0.461** 0.257
(0.17) (0.21) (0.25)
UNGA Voting Affinity 0.590 3.688*** -2.862**
(0.94) (1.33) (1.17)
Reuters News Count 0.050 0.032 0.083
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
Quality of Governance -0.432 -0.600 -1.039
(0.83) (1.02) (1.08)
Democracy -0.422* -0.379 -0.376
(0.22) (0.27) (0.32)
Human Rights 0.017 0.079 -0.105
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14)
Natural Disaster Deaths -0.010 -0.015 0.021
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Civil Conflict 0.105 0.083 0.228
(0.35) (0.41) (0.63)
Distance 0.066 -0.168 0.757***
(0.25) (0.36) (0.29)
Former Colony -0.264 -2.707 5.766
(3.78) (3.56) (5.30)
Trade Intensity -0.043 -0.090* 0.181**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Security Council 0.259 0.060 0.916*
(0.31) (0.37) (0.49)
Population 4.865 9.385* -6.513
(4.58) (5.62) (6.45)
Total Aid per capita -0.037* -0.084*** 0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
N 9442 7007 2435
Table 8: Controlling for UNGA Voting Similarity, using the “s3un” measure.
+p = 0.11, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05. Donor, recipient country and year fixed effects included
(not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
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